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or transcendentalism. And either view seems, in your article, to pass over very easily into its opposite, in good old Hegelian fashion.

Is there another alternative which I have overlooked?

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

The Logic of Human Character. CHARLES J. WHITBY. London, Macmillan & Co. 1905. Pp. vi + 225.

In attempting to state the general aim of this book we meet at once with its most serious defect, the absence of clear self-characterization. The title, to be sure, is very suggestive. But what, we are at once prompted to inquire, *is* a 'logic of character'? That it involves an analysis of 'organized spiritual structure' in general, and without reference to the special circumstances which condition the individual life, is made clear; as is the fact that it deals with life normatively rather than psychologically. But beyond this point we are left to gather the method from the results of its application. The succession of the phases of character which are described is not an historical succession. It is not safe, we are told, to follow the historical development of the race, or of the individual, if we are to grasp 'the abstract dialectical process which is the true but hidden law of that development.' Indeed, the phases of character are only abstractly separate at all, since all are 'implicitly' present in each, and character is essentially indivisible. The nearest approach to an explanation of the principle of the 'dialectical process' is the following passage:

"The experience of mankind in the course of ages has, by a slow unconscious process of generalization, isolated a number of test-conditions. The normal response of a rational individual to each of these test-conditions becomes the basis of a corresponding number of conceptions of essential elements of character or virtue" (p. 207). Add to this the passage in which the author says that the 'ultimate *raison d'être*' of every normal code, is 'nothing else than the progressive revelation to mankind of the true law of their own innermost being, the condition of self-realization, harmony, unity of life' (pp. 160–161).

We shall expect the elements of character defined to represent an orderly progression from the more crude and indispensable, to the mature and consummate. If such be the intent, the arrangement is questionable. It is difficult, *e. g.*, to see why 'personal character' or 'the logic of duty' is placed before 'practical character' or 'the logic of action.'

If the logical order of the six main divisions of character fails to be convincing this is equally true of their carefully articulated subdivisions.

In the preliminary discussion of the 'psychological elements' of character we are supplied with three 'esthetic' elements, 'sensation,' 'emotion,' and 'disposition'; three 'ratiocinative' elements, 'perception,' 'reflection' and 'judgment'; and three 'practical' elements, 'automation,' 'mimesis' and 'volition.' This classification is very neat, but seems not

to be used at all. Thereafter each successive chapter is similarly divided into thrice three parts; but save in the concluding case of 'love,' 'wisdom' and 'genius,' where the correspondence is explicitly mentioned, these would seem to have no relation whatsoever to the preliminary analysis.

It is to be regretted that the author has not supplied the key to his 'logic.' We can only conjecture that the machinery is moved by the power of 'abstraction,' and that very essential parts of it must be denoted by the phrases 'first or immediate category,' 'second or formal category,' 'third or real category,' etc., which stand at the head of the chapters, but receive no further comment.

Notwithstanding the obscurity which attaches to its logical nexus, this is a most thoughtful and solid book. The style is compact, lucid and at times masterly. When one ceases to puzzle about the meaning of the arrangement, and regards it as only a convenient classification, it is found to add greatly to the richness and clearness of the analysis. As has been noted, there are six general phases of character, distinguished by the dominance in the individual of different controls. These six phases are: (1) Custom, or implicit character; (2) duty, or personal character; (3) action, or practical character; (4) piety, or social character; (5) freedom, or individual character; (6) creation, or universal character. Thus the highest condition of human life is that of creation. The unfolding of this crowning phase of life is seen in the growth of impulse into passion and finally into love; the growth of intuition into 'detachment,' or disinterestedness of judgment, and finally into wisdom; or aspiration into inspiration, and finally into genius.

"Love, wisdom, genius—in these three principles culminate respectively the emotional, theoretical, and practical potentialities of human character. They are at once its flower and root, its final cause, and the end whose realization it has, or should have, ever before it" (p. 199).

The emphasis which the author thus places upon the individual's self-expression leads him in his concluding chapter to certain profound and eloquent observations upon contemporary ideals and educational methods.

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Les états mystiques. MONTMORAND. *Revue Philosophique.* July, 1905.

The writer's purpose is to compare the descriptions which psychologists are disposed to give of the trance-conditions of religious mystics with the descriptions given by the mystics themselves. The latter are entirely sincere in their accounts and have immediate knowledge of the states in question. For their opinions, M. Montmorand depends chiefly upon the writings of Saint Teresa.

The mystics make great use of the word experience in describing the kind of state they are most concerned with, and which they affirm is a state of entire passivity. As a rule they strive to imagine God, but at times it is their good fortune to feel his immediate presence, to behold him even. They have a 'spiritual' sensation, a sense of fusion of immersion. The spiritual life is compared to a bath of love, or the soul to a sponge in the ocean.